Cosmic Fine-Tuning vs. Many Universes

In class today I described the cosmic fine-tuning version of the design argument and the standard "many universes" counter-hypothesis. I also described how each side can appeal to Ockham's Razor (don't complicate explanatory hypotheses more than necessary) as a tie-breaker. The problem with such appeals, I said, is that Ockham's Razor can be wielded in different ways to different effect, leaving the outcome in this case somewhat ambiguous.

Kurt raised the issue of intelligibility - do we really have enough of a grip on the idea of God, or of a transcendent Designer, for it to be a meaningful hypothesis? That's a legitimate worry, one that a theist can only meet by articulating the idea of God in terms that we do have some grip on. Presumably we do have some understanding of notions like having power, being a person, goodness, being knowledgeable and wise, etc. for the theist to get started. Can the theist go far enough with this to meet the concern? I'll leave that for you to decide or work out on your own.

I'd like to close with a worry that I have about the Many Universes Hypothesis (MUH). The concern is that this amounts to an illegitimate multiplication of our probabilistic resources. Why illegitimate? Because it's ad hoc. I don't see that we have any independent reasons, apart from the desire to avoid positing a cosmic Designer, for thinking that these universes exist. By hypothesis, these universes are causally isolated from our own, so there couldn't in principle be any empirical evidence for their existence. The most we can say is that, for all we know, they could exist. But I can say that much about pretty much anything, and that's why I think there's got to be independent justification of some kind for taking it seriously in this case. For example, if I come across a collected edition of Shakespeare's writings I would explain it in terms of design. Alternatively, however, I could hypothesize it as the result of a whole lot of monkeys banging on word processors for a very long time. Now, if I had some independent reason for thinking that there actually were so many monkeys with access to functional word processors over such a long time, I might take that hypothesis seriously. But I have no such reasons, so I dismiss it out of hand.

The questions I'd like to pose, then, are these: Are there any independent reasons for thinking that MUH is true? And if not, then why is MUH worth taking seriously whereas the monkey hypothesis is not?

Finally, I would like to observe that the adhocness charge doesn't count equally against theism because we have (or so it seems) several independent reasons for thinking that a being like God exists (cosmological arguments, religious experience, etc.).

My Take on Kant's Antinomy of Time

In the previous post I presented a pair of conflicting arguments by philosopher Immanuel Kant, who presents them to show, among other things, that limit questions like the beginning of time are cannot be theoretically resolved by beings like ourselves. Here's my take on those two arguments.

The first argument, recall, was this:

Part I: Time Has a Beginning
1. If there is no beginning of time, then at any given moment an actually infinite series of successive states would have elapsed. (premise)
2. But it is impossible for an actually infinite series of successive states to elapse. (premise)
3. Hence, there must be a beginning of time. (from 1 & 2)

I take this argument to be sound if the tensed, dynamic, or 'A' theory of time is correct. Given the tenseless, static, or 'B' theory of time, however, premise (1) is false, since there is no objective elapsing of successive states. Premise (2) seems a truism to me, and the argument seems to be a valid instance of modus tollens (denying the consequent), so for me it all comes down to premise (1). And since I am inclined to accept an 'A' theory of time, I think the argument is a sound one.

What, then, about the second argument, which purports to show that time cannot have had a beginning? Since I accept the first argument, I expect to find a flaw in the second argument. That argument, recall, was this:

Part II: Time Has No Beginning
4. It is impossible for anything to begin without an elapse of time. (premise)
5. Hence, if time began, then there would have to be a time before time. (from 4)
6. But it is impossible for there to be a time before time. (premise)
7. Hence, it is impossible for there to be a beginning of time. (from 5 & 6)

Premises (4) and (6) seem to be a truisms, and since (5) and (7) are supposed to be deducible ultimately from (4) and (6), if there's a flaw in the argument it has to be in the logic. The inference from (5) and (6) to (7), however, is obviously valid. So it must be in the inference from (4) to (5) that the argument goes wrong. Indeed, that's where I think the problem lies. You see, (4) is ambiguous between

(4*) It is impossible for anything to begin without there having already been an elapse of time.

and

(4**) It is impossible for anything to begin without there being an elapse of time.

(5) follows from (4*), but (4*), I submit, is false. Why? Well, suppose that there is a necessarily existing being (God) who created the universe ex nihilo. As necessarily existing, God is necessarily eternal, and so, it would seem, need not change at all. If not for the act of creating, then, God would be completely unchanging and therefore timeless. The act of creation brings about a change as follows:

Just God (no time because no before and after)

Just God ---> God + creation
(before) (after)

In this scenario, God's very act of creating effects a change from "Just God" to "God + creation", and so brings about (or, rather, just is) an elapse of time. Hence, (4**) is true in this case. But (4*) is not. Apart from the act of creating on God's part there is no "before" or "after", instead there is "Just God".

(4**) is, I think, true. Every beginning is characterized by a before-after sequence of states which just is an elapse of time. But (5) doesn't follow from (4**) as it does from (4*). In the scenario I just described there is a beginning to time that does not involve a previous elapse of time, and so it does not imply a time before time.

Kalam Argument: Craig vs. Kant

William Lane Craig argues that the universe (and time with it) began to exist, and he marshals several arguments to that end. Immanuel Kant, however, contends that the question of whether time began or not cannot be answered. He tries to show this by arguing both sides of the question:

Part I: Time Has a Beginning
1. If there is no beginning of time, then at any given moment an actually infinite series of successive states would have elapsed. (premise)
2. But it is impossible for an actually infinite series of successive states to elapse. (premise)
3. Hence, there must be a beginning of time. (from 1 & 2)

Part II: Time Has No Beginning
4. It is impossible for anything to begin without an elapse of time. (premise)
5. Hence, if time began, then there would have to be a time before time. (from 4)
6. But it is impossible for there to be a time before time. (premise)
7. Hence, it is impossible for there to be a beginning of time. (from 5 & 6)

Kant's first argument parallels one of Craig's arguments for the beginning of the universe. The second argument results in the opposite conclusion. Kant himself thought that these two arguments were equally good, and, therefore, that the question of the beginning of time was beyond the bounds of human reason.

Is Kant right that these arguments are equally good? Or are they equally bad? Can Craig consistently defend the first argument while rejecting the second? If so, how might he be able to pull that off? Or does the second argument refute the kalam?

A Version of the Cosmological Argument

OK, here's a version of the cosmological argument to think about:

1. The universe is a contingent thing (i.e., it cannot account for its own existence).
2. Contingent things need an ultimate explanation for their existence.
3. Whatever stands in need of a certain type of explanation cannot be ultimately explained by something that itself stands in need of the same type of explanation.
4. Therefore, the universe cannot be ultimately explained by anything contingent. (1,2,3)
5. Therefore, there must be a noncontingent (i.e., necessary) thing that is the ultimate explanation of the existence of the universe. (1,2,4)

Premise 3 seems to be true by definition of ‘ultimate’. That leaves premises 1 and 2.

In defense of 1 we might point to the Big Bang theory, which suggests that the universe came into being about 13.7 billion years ago.

In defense of 2 we might suggest that if something requires an explanation and the explainer in turn requires the same sort of explanation, then all we’ve done is push the question back a step, which, arguably, is not very satisfying.

For example, suppose for the moment that the question “What holds the Earth up?” is a question worth taking seriously. Obviously, it will not do to answer “The Earth rests on the back of a giant turtle” because we can meaningfully ask the same question of the turtle (“What holds the turtle up?”). If we continue in the same vein, we generate an infinite regress (“It’s turtles all the way down”), unless we can find some way to terminate the sequence with a being that needs no support (“Turtle #25 is resting on The Bottom”). This seems to be an appropriate ultimate stopping point because it doesn’t make much sense to ask “What holds The Bottom up?”

Now, change the question to "Why does the universe exist?" If we answer by appealing to another contingent thing, say, a previous universe, they we merely push matters back a step, for we can ask the same question of that universe, and so on. That may seem unsatisfying. But if we answer by appealing to a necessary or non-contingent being, then the same question cannot be sensibly repeated. "Why does a necessary being exist?" is a dumb question - it's necessary, after all.

Humor: Vote for Zod

In my last post I made a reference to "Zod" as a possible name for a worst conceivable being based on a DC Comics super-villain. Well, it turns out that General Zod is running for president.