PHIL 459 Discussion Blog

Two Articles Relevant to Recent Class Topics

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Fri, 25 Apr 2008 00:19:00 +0000

1) Philosopher William Vallicella argues that the Buddhist "no-self" doctrine (the view that nothing has an enduring self-nature) is self-refuting here. (Incidentally, if any of you want to write a paper on Buddhism, this would be a fine article to comment on.)

2) Yandell remarks that contemporary dismissals of mind-body dualism (an assumption of Jainism and of most monotheists) are a reflection of academic "fashion" and not a consequence of there being decisive arguments against dualism. Philosopher William Lycan, himself not a dualist, admits as much here.

Religious Pluralism

noreply@blogger.com (Brad Schwartz) — Thu, 17 Apr 2008 22:57:00 +0000

In class Pluralism or 1st Definition- The idea that all religions are basically the same

Different Definition or 2nd definition- Religious Pluralism may describe the world view that one's religion is not the sole and exclusive source of truth, and thus recognizes that some level of truth and value exists in at least some other religions.

My question is if children were raised by the idea of definition 2 of religious pluralism, would that make a more productive society. (such as more compromise, less war, and more open mindedness). Since children would be raised by many different religions from birth and when their an adult they could be allowed to choose what truths they see in each religion.

An example is lets say theres two guys Bob and George. Bob is a guy who has only 1 friend for 20 years, and George has had 15 different friends for the past 20 years. If you ask them to describe what a friend is Bob would only have one definition of a friend and would probably be closed minded on what a friend should because he's only experienced that one type of friend. Bob I would say would probably only be open to accept friends just like his only friend and be limited on new friend experiences. On the other hand George would have many definitions of a friend, be open to new types of friends, and probably not as close minded as what a friend should be due to his multiple definitions. I believe George would be open to new friend experiences and and different type of friends. In my opinion making him a better authority on what a friend can be because of his open mindedness and experiences.

I relate this to 2nd definition of religious pluralism. If children were raised by a bunch of religions and when they were finally adults got to choose what they thought the truth was. They would be less partial to one definition of the truth and be more open to other truths. Relating to the example of Bob (the example of religion now) and George (example of 2nd definition of religious pluralism). Bob would be more close minded on new truths, while George would have a more open minded approach to new truths. Making George a more productive seeker of the truth in my opinion.

Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Tue, 01 Apr 2008 22:10:00 +0000

I am of the opinion that God cannot have infallible foreknowledge of creaturely libertarian free choices. I'd like to try to explain why I think this.

First, I should define my terms. By 'infallible' I mean the impossibility of error. By 'foreknowledge' I mean knowledge of an event that is temporally prior to that event. Thus, "S foreknows that event E will occur" means that at some time t S knows that E will occur at some time subsequent to t. By 'knowledge' here I mean merely non-accidentally true belief. By 'true belief' I mean one the propositional content of which corresponds to how things actually are. By 'libertarian free choices' I mean choices in which the agent has an unconditional power to choose otherwise immediately prior to the time of the choice.

Now, for knowledge to obtain requires that there be a proper sort of relation between knower and known. Since knowledge entails truth, and truth consists in correspondence with reality, knowledge requires that there be a correspondence between mind and world, between what is believed to be the case and what is the case. Furthermore, since knowledge entails that true belief be non-accidental, there must be something that grounds or secures the mind-world correspondence. The possibilities for this seem to be limited to the following:

World determines mind (e.g., God knows what will happen because it does happen).
Mind determines world (e.g., God knows what will happen because he decrees that it happen and ensures that that decree is fulfilled).
There is a probabilistic, non-determining relation between mind and world.
There is a brute, ungrounded correlation between mind and world.

If (1) is the case, then God can have infallible knowledge of creaturely libertarian free choices, but it cannot, strictly speaking, be "fore"-knowledge. Rather, since God's knowledge on this scenario is grounded in the actual occurrences of the events themselves it is more aptly described as "post"-knowledge, for the events must already have happened before God can know about them. Proponents of divine timelessness will resist that way of putting it, but they too deny that God literally has "fore"-knowledge.

If (2) is the case, then God can have infallible knowledge of creaturely choices, but these choices cannot be free in a libertarian sense. If God knows that a creaturely choice will be made because he determines that it is made, then the creature cannot have unconditional power to choose otherwise. Instead, the creature will only have a conditional power of contrary choice - it is only IF God had decreed otherwise, that one could have chosen otherwise.

If (3) is the case, then God can have "knowledge" in the sense of non-accidentally true beliefs about what creaturely libertarian free choices will be made, but this knowledge cannot be infallible. Infallible knowledge requires not merely non-accidental truth, but also the impossibility of falsity.

Finally, if (4) is the case, then God can have true beliefs about what creatures with libertarian freedom will do, but not knowledge. The reason is that, on this option, the non-accidentality criterion for knowledge is not satisfied. That God's beliefs about what will happen sync up with what does happen turns out to be sheer luck.

So something has to give. We have to reject either (a) creaturely libertarian freedom, or (b) exhaustive, infallible divine foreknowledge.

Theism and Incompatible Properties

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Tue, 01 Apr 2008 22:06:00 +0000

One of this week's reading is Theodore Drange's article "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey", in which he presents several arguments aimed at showing that various attributes of God that many theists affirm result in contradictions. In my view, most of these alleged contradictions are fairly easy for a careful theist to avoid. Others are more challenging. Here's one that I find particularly interesting:

The Justice versus Mercy Argument
1. If God exists, then he is an all-just judge.
2. If God exists, then he is an all-merciful judge.
3. An all-just judge treats every offender with exactly the severity than he/she deserves.
4. An all-merciful judge treats every offender with less severity than he/she deserves.
5. It is impossible to treat an offender both with exactly the severity that he/she deserves and also with less severity than he/she deserves.
6. Hence, it is impossible for an all-just judge to be an all-merciful judge. (from 3-5)
7. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist. (from 1,2,6)

As Drange notes, many theists seem to want to affirm all of the premises, but this lands them in a contradiction. Is this a convincing refutation of theism? Or can a theist plausibly deny one or more of the premises (esp. 1-4)? If so, which premise should the theist reject and why?

Feel free to address this or any of Drange's other arguments.

Divine Providence and Evil

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Wed, 12 Mar 2008 20:14:00 +0000

I'd like to offer some thoughts comparing three different models of divine providence in relation to the problem of evil. The models I want to discuss are (1) theological determinism (hereafter 'Calvinism'), (2) Molinism, and (3) open theism. [Full disclosure: My sympathies are with (3).]

By 'Calvinism' I mean the view that God has meticulously decreed "whatsoever comes to pass". In other words, God knowingly and specifically "plans, orders, and provides" for every event, past, present, and future. There are no non-logical limits apart from God's own nature constraining what kinds of worlds God can bring to pass.

By 'Molinism' I mean the view that God has meticulously decreed whatsoever comes to pass, but that there are non-logical limits apart from God's own nature, that constrain what God can bring to pass. Specifically, according to Molinism, God's creative decision is based on his pre-volitional knowledge of so-called "counterfactuals of creaturely freedom" (CCF's), over which he has no control. According to Molinism, God knew, for any possible free creature S and any possible circumstance C and any possible action A (such that S could be free in C with respect to doing A) either (a) If placed in C, S would freely do A or (b) If placed in C, S would freely refrain from doing A. Because God has no control over which of those counterfactuals is true, his creative options are narrowed from the class of all possible world to the class of all feasible worlds (i.e., those possible worlds that are compatible with the true CCF's).

By 'open theism' I mean the view that God has not meticulously decreed whatsoever comes to pass but has rather has left some aspects of history 'open', i.e., to be determined by the free decisions of his creatures.

Now, the problem of evil challenges theists to reconcile the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God with the existence of extensive, and often apparently gratuitous, suffering in the world. Theists generally try to meet the problem, at least in part, by developing 'theodicies' that try to show that God is justified in allowing various kinds of evils for the sake of promoting various kinds of goods. Many theodicies have been proposed, but it is generally agreed that the most plausible theodicies are variations on the "free will defense" (FWD). The basic idea is that giving creatures free will, so that they can choose between good and evil, is a good thing because it makes possible goods like genuine loving relationships that would not be possible otherwise. Moreover, God could not have given creatures free will and also guaranteed in advance that they never misused it. When creatures misuse their freedom to do evil, it is they, not God, who are to blame.

Now, let's look at our three theories of divine providence in relation to the problem of evil.

Calvinism is clearly limited in its options because it has to eschew the FWD. Why did God decree the Fall, the Holocaust, and all the thousands of atrocities and natural disasters throughout history? There is not much the Calvinist can say beyond "God only knows". That's the "skeptical theist" response - it's useful in moderation, but promotes moral skepticism and indifference in excess. In the end, Calvinism implies that God has created either the best of all possible worlds, or, if there is more than one such world, then one of the class of best possible worlds, or if there is no precise standard for determining a class of "best" possible worlds, then one of the class of "pretty darn good" possible worlds. It is far from clear, however, that this is such a world.

Molinism fares better. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCF's) that it posits possess their truth values independently of God. Thus, if God creates Adam and puts him in a certain situation, then God can be certain ahead of time that Adam will freely choose to sin, but God can do nothing about it short of either not creating Adam or creating him but not allowing him into any situation in which he would freely choose to sin. In addition, the Molinist can make use of the FWD, for if Adam freely sins, then God is exonerated because Adam is the one who sinned, and because God couldn't have created Adam and put him in those circumstances and prevented him from sinning. But, one wonders, why didn't God do something different if he was sure that Adam would freely sin? The standard reply is that Adam, as well as every other free creature God could have created, possessed "trans-world depravity". In other words, no matter which free creature God could have created, that being would have freely chosen to sin in similar circumstances. Frankly, I find the idea of trans-world depravity rather implausible. Given the trillions upon trillions of possible free creatures that God could have created and the unknown multitudes of circumstances he could have situated them in, surely God could have found enough possible free creatures to populate a world in which moral evil was much rarer than it is in ours. And if so, then why didn't God create that kind of world instead? In summary, Molinism implies that God has created either the best of all feasible worlds, or, if there is more than one such world, then one of the class of best feasible worlds, or if there is no precise standard for determining a class of "best" feasible worlds, then one of the class of "pretty darn good" feasible worlds. Again, it is far from clear that this is such a world.

Open theism, I think, fares better still. Open theists reject the meticulous providence of both Calvinism and Molinism. So they don't have to deal with God's eternally decreeing evils or of God's willing to create a world when he knew ahead of time that it would contain all the evils that ours does. According to open theism, because God has sovereignly decided to create a world with free creatures, the outcome of the world depends to a large extent on what choices those creatures make. And, since future free choices haven't yet been made and cannot be predicted with certainty on the basis of past and present events, God cannot know for certain how the world will turn out in all its particulars. This helps because God would seem to be less blameworthy for not preventing evils that he couldn't know in advance would happen. On the open theist view, an all-good God would be expected to create not the best of all possible worlds or the best of all feasible worlds, but the best of all possible means to the best of all possible worlds. Or if there is no unique best means, then one of the class of best possible means. Or, if there is no precise standard for determining a class of "best" possible means, then one of the class of "pretty darn good" possible means. Or, qualifying the goal as well, a "pretty darn good" means to a "pretty darn good" possible world. And now, I think, it is not so clear that our world is not such a world.

Saving a Baby from a Burning Building

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 01:00:00 +0000

This week we're looking at the problem of evil, so here's something to think about.

Atheist B.C. Johnson in The Atheist Debater's Handbook argues that it is unlikely that God is all good, and hence unlikely that God exists (b/c theists universally suppose God to be all-good). Johnson begins his case with an illustration. Imagine that due to an electrical short, a building catches on fire. Trapped in the building is an infant, who will surely be burned to death unless someone intervenes. Imagine further that there is a human pedestrian who knows of the baby's plight and can easily intervene without any serious harm to herself and, nevertheless, leaves the baby to die. Surely, says Johnson, we would think such a person is morally blameworthy for failing to intervene. But how are things any different with God? God could easily intervene, yet such tragedies occur on a regular basis without any apparent divine intervention. So, says Johnson, just as we would judge the uncaring human to be a bad person, so also we should say the same of God. Any God who refrains from intervening to prevent egregious evils without excellent justification would not be a morally good God.

To buttress his argument, Johnson considers a variety of "excuses" that might be offered to get God "off the hook". For example, one response might be that the baby will go to heaven, but Johnson argues that this is irrelevant to the baby's suffering apart from some argument that suffering is necessary to go to heaven. Another response might be that God does not prevent such suffering because it is necessary either for a greater good or to avoid a greater evil. But, says Johnson, this implies that whatever happens is overall best since God allowed it, and that, he thinks, is absurd. Obviously the world could have been better than it is. Yet another response might be that God granted humans free will and so if a human causes a child to suffer (perhaps in this case the building superintendent was negligent in keeping up with repairs, which led to the fire) it is the human's fault alone. But, says Johnson, one can be at fault for not having intervened in events that are caused by another person, just as the pedestrian should intervene to save the baby despite the fact that she had nothing to do with causing the fire.

After considering several additional replies and finding all of them wanting, Johnson concludes that God has no good excuse for allowing babies to burn to death. He concludes that there is no morally relevant difference between God and the human pedestrian who could have intervened and didn't. Both are morally blameworthy.

How should we evaluate Johnson's argument? It all seems to hang on this question: To what extent is God's position morally analogous to the position of the human pedestrian? Johnson thinks the analogy is a very close one, but is it? To evaluate Johnson's argument we have to consider ways in which God's position vis-a-vis the baby in the building is different from the pedestrian's and ask ourselves whether any of those differences make a difference to the moral situation. I have some thoughts to share on this, but first I want hear what some of you think.

Cosmic Fine-Tuning vs. Many Universes

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Thu, 21 Feb 2008 21:16:00 +0000

In class today I described the cosmic fine-tuning version of the design argument and the standard "many universes" counter-hypothesis. I also described how each side can appeal to Ockham's Razor (don't complicate explanatory hypotheses more than necessary) as a tie-breaker. The problem with such appeals, I said, is that Ockham's Razor can be wielded in different ways to different effect, leaving the outcome in this case somewhat ambiguous.

Kurt raised the issue of intelligibility - do we really have enough of a grip on the idea of God, or of a transcendent Designer, for it to be a meaningful hypothesis? That's a legitimate worry, one that a theist can only meet by articulating the idea of God in terms that we do have some grip on. Presumably we do have some understanding of notions like having power, being a person, goodness, being knowledgeable and wise, etc. for the theist to get started. Can the theist go far enough with this to meet the concern? I'll leave that for you to decide or work out on your own.

I'd like to close with a worry that I have about the Many Universes Hypothesis (MUH). The concern is that this amounts to an illegitimate multiplication of our probabilistic resources. Why illegitimate? Because it's ad hoc. I don't see that we have any independent reasons, apart from the desire to avoid positing a cosmic Designer, for thinking that these universes exist. By hypothesis, these universes are causally isolated from our own, so there couldn't in principle be any empirical evidence for their existence. The most we can say is that, for all we know, they could exist. But I can say that much about pretty much anything, and that's why I think there's got to be independent justification of some kind for taking it seriously in this case. For example, if I come across a collected edition of Shakespeare's writings I would explain it in terms of design. Alternatively, however, I could hypothesize it as the result of a whole lot of monkeys banging on word processors for a very long time. Now, if I had some independent reason for thinking that there actually were so many monkeys with access to functional word processors over such a long time, I might take that hypothesis seriously. But I have no such reasons, so I dismiss it out of hand.

The questions I'd like to pose, then, are these: Are there any independent reasons for thinking that MUH is true? And if not, then why is MUH worth taking seriously whereas the monkey hypothesis is not?

Finally, I would like to observe that the adhocness charge doesn't count equally against theism because we have (or so it seems) several independent reasons for thinking that a being like God exists (cosmological arguments, religious experience, etc.).

My Take on Kant's Antinomy of Time

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Tue, 19 Feb 2008 02:14:00 +0000

In the previous post I presented a pair of conflicting arguments by philosopher Immanuel Kant, who presents them to show, among other things, that limit questions like the beginning of time are cannot be theoretically resolved by beings like ourselves. Here's my take on those two arguments.

The first argument, recall, was this:

Part I: Time Has a Beginning
1. If there is no beginning of time, then at any given moment an actually infinite series of successive states would have elapsed. (premise)
2. But it is impossible for an actually infinite series of successive states to elapse. (premise)
3. Hence, there must be a beginning of time. (from 1 & 2)

I take this argument to be sound if the tensed, dynamic, or 'A' theory of time is correct. Given the tenseless, static, or 'B' theory of time, however, premise (1) is false, since there is no objective elapsing of successive states. Premise (2) seems a truism to me, and the argument seems to be a valid instance of modus tollens (denying the consequent), so for me it all comes down to premise (1). And since I am inclined to accept an 'A' theory of time, I think the argument is a sound one.

What, then, about the second argument, which purports to show that time cannot have had a beginning? Since I accept the first argument, I expect to find a flaw in the second argument. That argument, recall, was this:

Part II: Time Has No Beginning
4. It is impossible for anything to begin without an elapse of time. (premise)
5. Hence, if time began, then there would have to be a time before time. (from 4)
6. But it is impossible for there to be a time before time. (premise)
7. Hence, it is impossible for there to be a beginning of time. (from 5 & 6)

Premises (4) and (6) seem to be a truisms, and since (5) and (7) are supposed to be deducible ultimately from (4) and (6), if there's a flaw in the argument it has to be in the logic. The inference from (5) and (6) to (7), however, is obviously valid. So it must be in the inference from (4) to (5) that the argument goes wrong. Indeed, that's where I think the problem lies. You see, (4) is ambiguous between

(4*) It is impossible for anything to begin without there having already been an elapse of time.

and

(4**) It is impossible for anything to begin without there being an elapse of time.

(5) follows from (4*), but (4*), I submit, is false. Why? Well, suppose that there is a necessarily existing being (God) who created the universe ex nihilo. As necessarily existing, God is necessarily eternal, and so, it would seem, need not change at all. If not for the act of creating, then, God would be completely unchanging and therefore timeless. The act of creation brings about a change as follows:

Just God (no time because no before and after)

Just God ---> God + creation
(before) (after)

In this scenario, God's very act of creating effects a change from "Just God" to "God + creation", and so brings about (or, rather, just is) an elapse of time. Hence, (4**) is true in this case. But (4*) is not. Apart from the act of creating on God's part there is no "before" or "after", instead there is "Just God".

(4**) is, I think, true. Every beginning is characterized by a before-after sequence of states which just is an elapse of time. But (5) doesn't follow from (4**) as it does from (4*). In the scenario I just described there is a beginning to time that does not involve a previous elapse of time, and so it does not imply a time before time.

Kalam Argument: Craig vs. Kant

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Tue, 12 Feb 2008 21:04:00 +0000

William Lane Craig argues that the universe (and time with it) began to exist, and he marshals several arguments to that end. Immanuel Kant, however, contends that the question of whether time began or not cannot be answered. He tries to show this by arguing both sides of the question:

Part I: Time Has a Beginning
1. If there is no beginning of time, then at any given moment an actually infinite series of successive states would have elapsed. (premise)
2. But it is impossible for an actually infinite series of successive states to elapse. (premise)
3. Hence, there must be a beginning of time. (from 1 & 2)

Part II: Time Has No Beginning
4. It is impossible for anything to begin without an elapse of time. (premise)
5. Hence, if time began, then there would have to be a time before time. (from 4)
6. But it is impossible for there to be a time before time. (premise)
7. Hence, it is impossible for there to be a beginning of time. (from 5 & 6)

Kant's first argument parallels one of Craig's arguments for the beginning of the universe. The second argument results in the opposite conclusion. Kant himself thought that these two arguments were equally good, and, therefore, that the question of the beginning of time was beyond the bounds of human reason.

Is Kant right that these arguments are equally good? Or are they equally bad? Can Craig consistently defend the first argument while rejecting the second? If so, how might he be able to pull that off? Or does the second argument refute the kalam?

A Version of the Cosmological Argument

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Tue, 05 Feb 2008 21:27:00 +0000

OK, here's a version of the cosmological argument to think about:

The universe is a contingent thing (i.e., it cannot account for its own existence).
Contingent things need an ultimate explanation for their existence.
Whatever stands in need of a certain type of explanation cannot be ultimately explained by something that itself stands in need of the same type of explanation.
Therefore, the universe cannot be ultimately explained by anything contingent. (1,2,3)
Therefore, there must be a noncontingent (i.e., necessary) thing that is the ultimate explanation of the existence of the universe. (1,2,4)

Premise 3 seems to be true by definition of ‘ultimate’. That leaves premises 1 and 2.

In defense of 1 we might point to the Big Bang theory, which suggests that the universe came into being about 13.7 billion years ago.

In defense of 2 we might suggest that if something requires an explanation and the explainer in turn requires the same sort of explanation, then all we’ve done is push the question back a step, which, arguably, is not very satisfying.

For example, suppose for the moment that the question “What holds the Earth up?” is a question worth taking seriously. Obviously, it will not do to answer “The Earth rests on the back of a giant turtle” because we can meaningfully ask the same question of the turtle (“What holds the turtle up?”). If we continue in the same vein, we generate an infinite regress (“It’s turtles all the way down”), unless we can find some way to terminate the sequence with a being that needs no support (“Turtle #25 is resting on The Bottom”). This seems to be an appropriate ultimate stopping point because it doesn’t make much sense to ask “What holds The Bottom up?”

Now, change the question to "Why does the universe exist?" If we answer by appealing to another contingent thing, say, a previous universe, they we merely push matters back a step, for we can ask the same question of that universe, and so on. That may seem unsatisfying. But if we answer by appealing to a necessary or non-contingent being, then the same question cannot be sensibly repeated. "Why does a necessary being exist?" is a dumb question - it's necessary, after all.

Humor: Vote for Zod

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Fri, 01 Feb 2008 23:57:00 +0000

In my last post I made a reference to "Zod" as a possible name for a worst conceivable being based on a DC Comics super-villain. Well, it turns out that General Zod is running for president.

Ontological Devil Arguments

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Tue, 29 Jan 2008 21:14:00 +0000

In class today we looked at Anselm's first version of the ontological argument (from Proslogion 2). We then looked at Gaunilo's attempt at a "refutation by parody" and showed how Anselm could respond by saying that there can be no "greatest conceivable island" because the qualities that go into that do not have intrinsic maxima (if there's no upper limit, then there can't be a "greatest").

Here's another parody:

Let "Satan" (or, if you prefer, Zod) =_def. the worst conceivable being. (Premise)
Satan exists in the understanding but not in reality. (Assumption for reductio)
Satan’s existence in reality and in the understanding would be worse than his existence in the understanding alone. (Premise)
A being having all of Satan’s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (Premise)
A being worse than Satan can be conceived. (From 2, 3, and 4)
It is false that a being worse than Satan can be conceived. (From 1)
Hence, it is false that Satan exists in the understanding but not in reality. (From 2, 5, and 6)
Satan exists in the understanding. (Premise)
Hence, Satan exists in reality. (From 7 and 8)

Is this a successful parody of Anselm's argument? Does the notion of "worst conceivable being" have an intrinsic maximum (or is intrinsic "minimum" more appropriate here?) Is there any way in which Anselm can block this counterexample without undermining his own argument?

Models of God

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Wed, 23 Jan 2008 20:53:00 +0000

Just a brief post to see if anyone had any questions about any of the non-monotheistic models of God that I touched on in the first class. Those alternative models were these:

Polytheism: There are many finite gods who exist wholly within the Cosmos.
Pantheism: Everything either is God, a part of God, or a mode or manifestation of God.
Panentheism: All is in God. The world is God's body. God and the Cosmos eternally exist in a symbiotic relationship.
Neo-Platonism: There is one eternal God from whom the Cosmos and all other realities necessarily emanate like light does from the Sun.

Here's another one that I didn't mention in class:

Plato's 'Demiurge': The Demiurge does not create the world ex nihilo but rather fashions it out of pre-existing matter or stuff. The Demiurge, material stuff, and the Platonic Forms are three independently existing parts of reality.

Do any other models of God come to mind?

Test Post

noreply@blogger.com (Alan Rhoda) — Sun, 20 Jan 2008 06:56:00 +0000

Hello everyone. This is a test post to make sure everyone is able to sign in to the Blogger system and make comments. So, once you've got a Google and Blogger account set up, please leave a brief comment. Just click on "comments" below.