Two Articles Relevant to Recent Class Topics

1) Philosopher William Vallicella argues that the Buddhist "no-self" doctrine (the view that nothing has an enduring self-nature) is self-refuting here. (Incidentally, if any of you want to write a paper on Buddhism, this would be a fine article to comment on.)

2) Yandell remarks that contemporary dismissals of mind-body dualism (an assumption of Jainism and of most monotheists) are a reflection of academic "fashion" and not a consequence of there being decisive arguments against dualism. Philosopher William Lycan, himself not a dualist, admits as much here.

Religious Pluralism

In class Pluralism or 1st Definition- The idea that all religions are basically the same

Different Definition or 2nd definition- Religious Pluralism may describe the world view that one's religion is not the sole and exclusive source of truth, and thus recognizes that some level of truth and value exists in at least some other religions.

My question is if children were raised by the idea of definition 2 of religious pluralism, would that make a more productive society. (such as more compromise, less war, and more open mindedness). Since children would be raised by many different religions from birth and when their an adult they could be allowed to choose what truths they see in each religion.

An example is lets say theres two guys Bob and George. Bob is a guy who has only 1 friend for 20 years, and George has had 15 different friends for the past 20 years. If you ask them to describe what a friend is Bob would only have one definition of a friend and would probably be closed minded on what a friend should because he's only experienced that one type of friend. Bob I would say would probably only be open to accept friends just like his only friend and be limited on new friend experiences. On the other hand George would have many definitions of a friend, be open to new types of friends, and probably not as close minded as what a friend should be due to his multiple definitions. I believe George would be open to new friend experiences and and different type of friends. In my opinion making him a better authority on what a friend can be because of his open mindedness and experiences.


I relate this to 2nd definition of religious pluralism. If children were raised by a bunch of religions and when they were finally adults got to choose what they thought the truth was. They would be less partial to one definition of the truth and be more open to other truths. Relating to the example of Bob (the example of religion now) and George (example of 2nd definition of religious pluralism). Bob would be more close minded on new truths, while George would have a more open minded approach to new truths. Making George a more productive seeker of the truth in my opinion.

Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom

I am of the opinion that God cannot have infallible foreknowledge of creaturely libertarian free choices. I'd like to try to explain why I think this.

First, I should define my terms. By 'infallible' I mean the impossibility of error. By 'foreknowledge' I mean knowledge of an event that is temporally prior to that event. Thus, "S foreknows that event E will occur" means that at some time t S knows that E will occur at some time subsequent to t. By 'knowledge' here I mean merely non-accidentally true belief. By 'true belief' I mean one the propositional content of which corresponds to how things actually are. By 'libertarian free choices' I mean choices in which the agent has an unconditional power to choose otherwise immediately prior to the time of the choice.

Now, for knowledge to obtain requires that there be a proper sort of relation between knower and known. Since knowledge entails truth, and truth consists in correspondence with reality, knowledge requires that there be a correspondence between mind and world, between what is believed to be the case and what is the case. Furthermore, since knowledge entails that true belief be non-accidental, there must be something that grounds or secures the mind-world correspondence. The possibilities for this seem to be limited to the following:

1. World determines mind (e.g., God knows what will happen because it does happen).
   
2. Mind determines world (e.g., God knows what will happen because he decrees that it happen and ensures that that decree is fulfilled).
   
3. There is a probabilistic, non-determining relation between mind and world.
4. There is a brute, ungrounded correlation between mind and world.

If (1) is the case, then God can have infallible knowledge of creaturely libertarian free choices, but it cannot, strictly speaking, be "fore"-knowledge. Rather, since God's knowledge on this scenario is grounded in the actual occurrences of the events themselves it is more aptly described as "post"-knowledge, for the events must already have happened before God can know about them. Proponents of divine timelessness will resist that way of putting it, but they too deny that God literally has "fore"-knowledge.

If (2) is the case, then God can have infallible knowledge of creaturely choices, but these choices cannot be free in a libertarian sense. If God knows that a creaturely choice will be made because he determines that it is made, then the creature cannot have unconditional power to choose otherwise. Instead, the creature will only have a conditional power of contrary choice - it is only IF God had decreed otherwise, that one could have chosen otherwise.

If (3) is the case, then God can have "knowledge" in the sense of non-accidentally true beliefs about what creaturely libertarian free choices will be made, but this knowledge cannot be infallible. Infallible knowledge requires not merely non-accidental truth, but also the impossibility of falsity.

Finally, if (4) is the case, then God can have true beliefs about what creatures with libertarian freedom will do, but not knowledge. The reason is that, on this option, the non-accidentality criterion for knowledge is not satisfied. That God's beliefs about what will happen sync up with what does happen turns out to be sheer luck.

So something has to give. We have to reject either (a) creaturely libertarian freedom, or (b) exhaustive, infallible divine foreknowledge.

Theism and Incompatible Properties

One of this week's reading is Theodore Drange's article "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey", in which he presents several arguments aimed at showing that various attributes of God that many theists affirm result in contradictions. In my view, most of these alleged contradictions are fairly easy for a careful theist to avoid. Others are more challenging. Here's one that I find particularly interesting:

The Justice versus Mercy Argument
1. If God exists, then he is an all-just judge.
2. If God exists, then he is an all-merciful judge.
3. An all-just judge treats every offender with exactly the severity than he/she deserves.
4. An all-merciful judge treats every offender with less severity than he/she deserves.
5. It is impossible to treat an offender both with exactly the severity that he/she deserves and also with less severity than he/she deserves.
6. Hence, it is impossible for an all-just judge to be an all-merciful judge. (from 3-5)
7. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist. (from 1,2,6)

As Drange notes, many theists seem to want to affirm all of the premises, but this lands them in a contradiction. Is this a convincing refutation of theism? Or can a theist plausibly deny one or more of the premises (esp. 1-4)? If so, which premise should the theist reject and why?

Feel free to address this or any of Drange's other arguments.